The Case for a State-Level Debt-Financing Authority by Gamage, David & Shanske, Darien
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
2013
The Case for a State-Level Debt-Financing
Authority
David Gamage
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, dgamage@indiana.edu
Darien Shanske
University of California, Davis
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Taxation-State and Local
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gamage, David and Shanske, Darien, "The Case for a State-Level Debt-Financing Authority" (2013). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2435.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2435
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206681
The Case for a State-Level
Debt-Financing Authority
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
David Gamage Darien Shanske
Introduction
Much has been written about state budget crises
and state-level fiscal distress.1 Of growing impor-
tance is the related topic of local government fiscal
distress. Unlike state governments, local govern-
ments can declare bankruptcy if specific precondi-
tions are satisfied. Looking just at California, the
recent bankruptcies in Vallejo, Stockton, and San
Bernardino demonstrate the pressing importance of
understanding local government finances.2
We have written previously about state-level tax
increase limitations (TILs).3 Local governments are
also often bound by TILs,4 and those TILs are a
significant contributor to the budgetary problems
facing local governments.
Yet there is an important fiscal constraint that
most local governments do not operate under —
namely, state-level fiscal controls regarding debt
issuance. In this essay, we argue for the adoption of
state-level debt-financing authorities as part of a
broader package for reforming local government
borrowing.
This analysis and its examples focus on Califor-
nia.5 Our recommendations, however, apply to most
states, not just to California.6 We focus on California
primarily for ease of exposition. Also, with the bank-
ruptcies of Stockton and San Bernardino, concerns
1For a selection of our prior writings on these topics, see
Darien Shanske, ‘‘How Less Can Be More: Using the Federal
Income Tax to Stabilize State and Local Finance,’’ 31 Va. Tax
Rev. 413 (2012); David Gamage, ‘‘Preventing State Budget
Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem,’’ 98 Cal. L.
Rev. 749 (2010); Shanske, ‘‘What Would the Delegates Talk
About? A Rough Agenda for a Constitutional Convention,’’ 37
Hastings Const. L.Q., 641 (2010); Gamage, ‘‘Coping Through
California’s Budget Crises in Light of Proposition 13 and
California’s Fiscal Constitution,’’ in Proposition 13 at 30,
edited by Jack Citrin and Isaac Martin, 2009.
2See California Legislative Analyst’s Office, ‘‘Local Govern-
ment Bankruptcy in California: Questions and Answers’’
(Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/
2012/localgov/local-government-bankruptcy-080712.aspx.
3Gamage and Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase Limitations:
Part II — Evasion and Transcendence,’’ State Tax Notes, Apr.
23, 2012, p. 245, Doc 2012-6379, or 2012 STT 78-3; Gamage
and Shanske, ‘‘On Tax Increase Limitations: Part I — A
Costly Incoherence,’’ State Tax Notes, Dec. 19, 2011, p. 813,
Doc 2011-25440, or 2011 STT 243-3.
4For instance, in California, see Cal. Const., Art. 13A,
section 4.
5At a recent conference sponsored by the Berkeley Insti-
tute for Governmental Studies, a participant asked why
California doesn’t have a local government commission mod-
eled on the successful North Carolina one. There is, in our
opinion, no good reason. That question was part of the initial
impetus for this essay.
6See, e.g., Robert Slavin, ‘‘Larkin: State Actions Are Key to
Local Bankruptcies,’’ The Bond Buyer, Aug. 6, 2012; Omer
Kimhi, ‘‘Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Finan-
cial Crises,’’ 88 B.U. L. Rev. 633, 636 (2008) (‘‘I claim that
. . . state financial boards, which place the burden of the
crisis on the state [are] the most efficient remedy for local
crises. The reason for this claim is that the state, as opposed
to the residents or the creditors, has the ability to prevent
potential crises and to minimize their harmful effects. Nei-
ther creditors nor local residents can avoid looming crises,
because often the causes of these crises are outside their (and
the local officials’) realm of control. The state, on the other
hand, has both the legal authority and the political power to
deal with the causes of urban crisis, and thereby to rehabili-
tate ailing localities’’).
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about local government borrowing seem more press-
ing in California — especially since California’s local
governments, particularly cities, are struggling with
the end of redevelopment funds (and with TILs).7
Moreover, events in California, such as the State
Legislature giving a state-level commission more
input on local government bankruptcies8 and the
comptroller taking a more active role in auditing
troubled cities,9 suggest that the Legislature is inch-
ing toward a more comprehensive approach for
regulating local government borrowing.
Ideally, we might recommend that California fol-
low North Carolina’s model, broadly empowering a
California local government commission to monitor
the fiscal affairs of the state’s cities and other local
government entities.10 But to keep our analysis
tractable, and also to highlight a clear path for
reform,11 we will focus on state monitoring of debt
issuance.
Our basic proposal has two simple components:
• state-level monitoring of local debt should be
increased; and
• the ability of local governments to issue debt
should be liberalized.12
Why Should a State Regulate Local
Government Borrowing?
Giving local governments the power to finance
capital projects is inherent in the arguments for
having decentralized governance in the first place.
For economic and political reasons, it makes sense to
assign governmental spending and taxing powers to
the lowest possible level of government capable of
providing a given service efficiently. For example,
the taxpayers who will actually use a school have
the right incentives to ensure that the school is both
excellent and a good use of their tax dollars. Yet a
school is a capital asset that will last through
several generations. It is often neither possible nor
advisable for a school building to be financed only
with the tax dollars of the current residents of a
school district. To do its job, the school district must
be able to match up benefits and burdens not just
geographically but also temporally. In other words,
local entities like school districts must be able to
borrow.
For a larger community to benefit
fully from decentralization, each
local government would have to
bear the entire cost of any poor
decisions made by that local
government.
There is considerable literature about the impor-
tance of regulating subnational borrowing.13 For a
larger community to benefit fully from decentraliza-
tion, each local government would have to bear the
entire cost of any poor decisions made by that local
7See, e.g., Billy Hamilton, ‘‘The Mermaid’s Tale: Califor-
nia’s Redevelopment Agency Fight,’’ State Tax Notes, Sept. 10,
2012, p. 743, Doc 2012-17839, or 2012 STT 175-4.
8Cal. Gov’t Code section 53760 et seq., added by AB 506,
2011-2012 Leg. Sess. and discussed in California Legislative
Analyst’s Office on bankruptcy, supra note 2.
9See, e.g., Randall Jensen, ‘‘California Controller Finds
Major Flaws in Hercules’ Record-Keeping,’’ The Bond Buyer,
May 15, 2012.
10A different regulator for each kind of local government
entity could make sense. California school districts are al-
ready monitored fairly closely by their county offices of
education. See, e.g., Calif. Ed. Code section 42127 (County
offices of education must approve school district budgets).
And in case of crisis, California created the Fiscal Crisis
Management and Assistant Team in 1991 (by AB 1200) to aid
school districts, and that structure seems to be operating
effectively. Calif. Ed. Code section 42127.8 (statute establish-
ing crisis management team), available at http://www.
fcmat.org/. See also, California Legislative Analyst’s Office, at
16-17, Apr. 30, 2012, available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/repor
ts/2012/edu/school-district-fiscal-oversight-and-intervention/s
chool-district-fiscal-oversight-and-intervention-043012.pdf
(assessing the current system and finding it effective), but see
Dan Weikel, ‘‘Risky Bonds Tie Schools to Huge Debt,’’ The Los
Angeles Times, Nov. 29, 2012. See, generally, It is difficult not
to read the LAO’s observation that there is not a state system
of monitoring city finances comparable to the one for moni-
toring school districts as anything but an appropriate criti-
cism. See Calif. LAO on bankruptcy, supra note 2.
We believe that the greater responsibility that California’s
state government has for education, especially post-
Proposition 13, is what has spurred the state to be more
proactive regarding school districts. It is now time for the
state government to take a more involved role for other
entities, as well.
11Among questions we do not address here is to what
extent state fiscal oversight, especially in a severe crisis (for
example, one requiring a state takeover), should be allowed to
trump local democratic values. For a discussion of this issue,
see Michelle Wilde Anderson, ‘‘Democratic Dissolution: Radi-
cal Experimentation in State Takeovers of Local Govern-
ments,’’ 39 Fordham Urb. L.J. 577 (2012). We do not think the
kinds of reforms to debt issuance we propose in this column
would affect democratic values significantly, especially since
we argue that any new restrictions on local debt issuance (for
example, fewer competitive sales) should be balanced by
enabling more local democratic decisions (that is, through
lowering voter approval thresholds).
12We would recommend the same basic approach for
reforming the TILs affecting local governments: Local TILs
should be loosened, but only if that is accompanied by greater
state oversight of local budgeting. For a related discussion,
see Shanske, ‘‘What Would the Delegates Talk About?’’ supra
note 1, at 650-651.
13See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, ‘‘Market Discipline and U.S.
Federalism,’’ in When States Go Broke 123, edited by Peter
Conti-Brown and David A. Skeel Jr., 2012; Teresa Ter-
Minassian, Borrowing by Subnational Governments-Issues
and Selected International Experiences, International Mon-
etary Fund, PPAA 96/4 (1996).
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government, including any choices regarding bor-
rowing. That rule is called a ‘‘hard budget con-
straint.’’ Hard budget constraints require local citi-
zens to take full ownership of their local government
because they bear the consequences of any local
government failures.14
However, there is a compelling argument that
higher levels of government cannot impose truly
hard budget constraints. There are many reasons for
that, including the sensible central government fear
of fiscal contagion if subnational governments are
left insolvent. Relatedly, there are likely to be many
other negative externalities if a locality is truly
allowed to cease providing essential services, such
as police and fire protection. Hence, because hard
budget constraints must always be imperfect, and
because lower-level government officials know that,
there is always a risk that lower-level governments
will borrow too much and thereby leave the higher
level of government on the hook.
Market discipline is one means for controlling
subnational borrowing; municipal creditors can
refuse to lend to any local government that does not
properly manage its affairs. However, though the
municipal market in the United States has been
(and remains) vigorous, it is not a perfect market.15
Because of the limitations of both hard budget
constraints and market discipline, it is therefore
common for central governments to impose tighter
regulation on local government borrowings before
poor borrowings occur.
Where is a local government to get
the money to run a bond
campaign?
There are other reasons to be concerned about
local government borrowing. Many smaller local
governments lack experience with municipal financ-
ing and, unsurprisingly, tend to pay higher borrow-
ing costs.16 And then there is the related problem of
pay-to-play arrangements.17 In California, as else-
where, local borrowing generally requires an elec-
tion and approval by a supermajority (usually two-
thirds) of voters.18 Where is a local government to
get the money to run a bond campaign? Public tax
dollars cannot be used. Conveniently, investment
banks (and finance professionals) hoping to earn
commissions in conducting the borrowing, should it
be approved, are often happy to contribute to bond
campaigns. There are local and federal laws and
regulations that seek to limit pay-to-play practice,
and more are likely on the way.19 Yet those rules are
not generally seen as effective.20
How Big Is the Problem and How Much
Would This Proposal Help?
To briefly investigate the scale of the problem, we
must first make a few distinctions. First, special
purpose entities are involved in most events of
default (for example, missing a payment) and those
of outright bankruptcy (filing under chapter 9 of the
federal bankruptcy code).21 Without a doubt, those
entities, like irrigation districts, especially when
14This model is complicated by the fact that citizens can
move among local government jurisdictions, but the basic
point still applies.
15See, e.g.,SecuritiesandExchangeCommission, ‘‘Reporton
the Municipal Securities Market’’ (July 31, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf.
Note that this report suggests changes to the municipal mar-
ketplace that, if implemented, could improve the functioning of
the municipal market, making further state-level reforms less
urgent.
16Bill Simonsen et al., ‘‘The Influence of Jurisdiction Size
and Sale Type on Municipal Bond Interest Rates: An Empiri-
cal Analysis,’’ 61 Public Administration Review 709 (2001); see
also, Lisa M. Fairchild and Timothy W. Koch, ‘‘The Impact of
State Disclosure Requirements on Municipal Yields,’’ 51 Nat.
Tax J. 733 (1998).
17See SEC report, supra note 15, at 102-103.
18California Constitution, Art. 16, section 18.
19See, e.g., Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Rule
G-37 (‘‘Political Contributions and Prohibitions on Municipal
Securities Business’’); Jonathan Hemmerdinger, ‘‘MSRB
Seeks More Disclosure on Bond Ballot Contributions,’’ The
Bond Buyer (Aug. 16, 2012).
20Randall Jensen, ‘‘Brokers’ Gifts That Keep Giving,’’ The
Bond Buyer (Jan. 17, 2012) (‘‘When broker-dealers give
money to California school bond campaigns, it appears to be
money well spent. A review of campaign finance records by
The Bond Buyer found a nearly perfect correlation between
broker-dealer contributions to California school bond efforts
in 2010 and their underwriting subsequent bond sales’’); see
also, Kevin Opp, comment, ‘‘Ending Pay-to-Play in the Mu-
nicipal Securities Business: MSRB Rule G-37 Ten Years
Later,’’ 76 U. of Colo. Law Rev. 243 (2005). The extent to
which one believes that localities were pushed into inappro-
priate financing might color one’s perspective on the extent to
which bondholders should share the pain in restructuring
those financings if they go bad. Cf. Clayton P. Gillette,
‘‘Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities,’’ 39
Fordham Urb. L.J. 639, 674 (2012). (‘‘If the objective in
assigning priorities to limited funds in the event of default
takes into account the relative capacity of the relevant actors
to monitor against fiscal distress, the fact that underwriters
who market bonds have both legal and financial incentives to
access the appropriate information indicates that bondhold-
ers may be better positioned to identify impending fiscal
distress than residents’’).
21See, e.g., Moody’s Investor Service, ‘‘Special Comment:
Recent Local Government Defaults and Bankruptcies May
Indicate a Shift in Willingness to Pay Debt’’ (July 19, 2012);
James E. Spiotto, ‘‘Chapter 9: The Last Resort for Financially
Distressed Municipalities,’’ in The Handbook of Municipal
Bonds 145, 147, edited by Sylvan G. Feldstein and Frank J.
Fabrozzi, 2008; Jason Appleson, Eric Parsons, and Andrew
Haughwout, ‘‘The Untold Story of Municipal Bond Defaults’’
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they are created by general purpose local govern-
ments, such as cities, should be monitored by a new
state-level authority. An example of those sublocal
special districts would be an assessment district
created by a city to put some utility lines under-
ground. When special-purpose entities get into
trouble, it is most often because the specific projects
they are financing run into trouble. This is called
enterprise risk. A state-level regulator could require
those districts to establish better financing struc-
tures and even to pursue better projects (for ex-
ample, by insisting on more conservative assump-
tions), but the new regulator could do only so much
if the project a special-purpose entity is created to
build is poorly conceived.
Special purpose entities, like
irrigation districts, especially when
they are created by general
purpose local governments, such
as cities, should be monitored by a
new state-level authority.
Bankruptcies of general purpose governments,
such as cities and counties, are rarer, though a few
recent bankruptcies, such as those of Vallejo and
Stockton, do suggest the possibility of a trend. De-
spite those high-profile cases, we agree with the
many analysts who do not believe that a municipal
bankruptcy tsunami looms, though there is some
likelihood of an increase in bankruptcies.22 The
reasons why an explosion of municipal bankruptcies
is unlikely are that the economy is slowly improving,
general purpose governments have a lot more flex-
ibility than special purpose entities, the stigma from
declaring bankruptcy is still significant, and bank-
ruptcy is far from a panacea.23 That said, the recov-
ery will come too late for some localities, and the
recent uptick in filings has reduced the stigma
somewhat.
Even if there were a significant increase in the
bankruptcies of general governments, such as
Vallejo, poor debt management practices are far
from the primary driver of local fiscal distress.24
That means that even for general purpose govern-
ments, our proposed new state-level regulator could
have only a limited effect. After all, better debt
management practices could hardly have saved a
locality from the effects of the Great Recession.
If we do not believe that there is necessarily a
large problem with local government bankruptcies
or defaults that could be solved with a state-level
regulator of debt issuances, why are we proposing a
solution? Our first answer is that the size of the
problem should not be measured in terms of the
quantity of bankruptcies and defaults. Even a small
number of defaults or bankruptcies can cause big
problems — most obviously in creating misery for
the citizens of a bankrupt locality, but also possibly
in generating fiscal contagion that may spread to
other localities and to the state. Poor debt issuance
practices that do not lead to a bankruptcy or default
may still result in tax dollars being misdirected,
thereby harming local government finances. If a
state-level system for managing local government
borrowing increases market trust in that borrowing
— as seems to have been the case in North Carolina
— the state-level system might thereby reduce bor-
rowing costs for all local governments within the
state, effectively increasing the resources available
for funding local government projects.
Our second reason for offering this proposal is
that given our national infrastructure needs, it is
not only that we have to ensure that every dollar is
well spent, but also that many more dollars will
likely have to be spent. 25 And for that to happen, we
(Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://libertystreeteconomics.
newyorkfed.org/2012/08/the-untold-story-of-municipal-bond-
defaults.html.
22See, e.g., Moody’s, supra note 21; Slavin, ‘‘Fitch Is Nega-
tive on Localities,’’ The Bond Buyer (Sept. 21, 2012) (Fitch
analysts see a possible increase in municipal bankruptcies,
but ‘‘for the most part issuers retain a strong willingness to
repay their debts’’); ‘‘Buffett Says Muni Bankruptcies Poised
to Climb as Stigma Lifts,’’ The Bond Buyer (July 16, 2012)
(Warren Buffett said the nation isn’t on the brink of hundreds
of billions of dollars in defaults, as banking analyst Meredith
Whitney predicted in 2010. ‘‘I don’t think we’re at the preci-
pice,’’ Buffett said. ‘‘People will use the threat of bankruptcy
to try and negotiate, particularly pension contracts, with
their employees’’).
23James E. Spiotto, ‘‘Financial Emergencies: Default and
Bankruptcy,’’ in The Oxford Handbook of State and Local
Government Finance 756, 762-763, edited by Robert D. Ebel
and John E. Petersen, 2012 (‘‘Whatever the outcome, the
Chapter 9 procedure [in the case of Vallejo] has been expen-
sive, time-consuming, and not an obvious solution to a mu-
nicipality facing labor problems’’).
24The bankruptcy of Jefferson County, Ala., is an exception
because a failed sewer financing was central to its fiscal
distress. Mary Walsh, ‘‘In Alabama, a County That Fell Off
the Financial Cliff,’’ The New York Times, Feb. 19, 2012, at B1.
25See ‘‘Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force,’’ 72-84
(2012), available at http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/
wp-content/images/Report-of-the-State-Budget-Crisis-Task-
Force-Full.pdf. Note that this task force also ended up recom-
mending a state-level monitoring agency modeled on that of
North Carolina. Id., at 55, 86. There are other reasons why
additional investments in infrastructure could be particularly
timely. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenstern, ‘‘Sandy Slapped Bond
Issuers, Too,’’ The New York Times at B1 (Nov. 11, 2012)
(argues for more bond financing post-Hurricane Sandy to
rebuild infrastructure, including a proposal for bond banks);
Julie Johnsson, Benjamin Haas, and Mark Chediak, ‘‘Sandy’s
Blackouts Pressure Utilities to Bury Power Lines,’’ Bloomberg
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believe, the public has to have more confidence in
local government financing techniques. We thus
propose that in ‘‘exchange’’ for establishing a strong
and professional state-level regulator, the voters of
California should be asked to approve lower voting
thresholds for bond approvals. In our view, the
expense (and risk) of creating a new state-level
regulator might not be worth it if not tied to a
liberalizing of local government finances.
We believe that adopting this package of reforms
is possible. As noted above, state-level debt manage-
ment reforms are now part of the political conversa-
tion. There have also been periodic proposals to
lower the vote thresholds for local government debt
issuance.26 Indeed, in 2000, California voters ap-
proved Proposition 39, which established a lower
approval threshold (55 percent versus two-thirds)
for (some) school bonds in return for more oversight
of those bonds (and other limits).27 In the eight years
since the passage of Proposition 39, the number of
school bond measures more than doubled, and al-
most half the money finally approved (over $20
billion) would not have been approved if not for the
lower threshold.28
Models for State Control Practices
There already exist a few examples of state regu-
latory regimes designed to ensure proper debt issu-
ance practices — regimes that roughly correspond to
what theory would recommend in the absence of
perfect budget constraints or market discipline.29
For example, in New York many entities must sell
their bonds competitively or get permission from the
State Comptroller’s Office to do otherwise.30 The
economic evidence in favor of requiring competitive
sales in most instances is robust,31 and to us, at
least, intuitive. Why not conduct an auction for a
product that is in many cases a commodity? Further,
requiring competitive sales is almost a complete
solution to the problem of pay to play at the local
level. If any voter-approved bonds will ultimately be
sold competitively, why should a particular firm
make a large donation to a bond campaign? There is,
therefore, a strong argument for a default rule
favoring competitive sales with a state-level regula-
tor having the power to authorize negotiated sales.
There is a strong argument for a
default rule favoring competitive
sales with a state-level regulator
having the power to authorize
negotiated bond sales.
The leading model of a state with a powerful
regulator is North Carolina. The North Carolina
Local Government Commission (LGC) must approve
local bond issues.32 It also has significant oversight
authority over the financial affairs of local govern-
ments generally.33 The LGC is commonly judged a
success both by academics and the market.34
News (Nov. 06, 2012), available at http://www.businesswe
ek.com/news/2012-11-05/sandy-s-blackouts-pressure-utilities-
to-bury-power-lines#p1.
26See, e.g., ACA 9, 2009-10 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); ACA 10,
2007-08 Leg. Sess (Cal. 2007).
27Calif. Const., Art. 13A, section (1)(b)(3), Calif. Educ.
Code section 15268.
28See Ellen Hanak, ‘‘Paying for Infrastructure,’’ 8-9 (Pub.
Pol’y Inst. of Cal. 2009), available at http://www.ppic.org/
main/publication.asp?i=863.
29Few states even have clear debt management policies.
See Mark D. Robbins and Casey Dungan, ‘‘Debt Diligence:
How States Manage the Borrowing Function,’’ 21 Public
Budgeting & Finance 88 (2001).
30See, e.g., New York Local Finance Law, sections 54.10,
57.00(a) (New York City must get the comptroller’s permis-
sion to sell bonds in a negotiated sale). See generally http://
www.osc.state.ny.us/pension/debtapprovals.htm (website of
the Bureau of Debt Management within the Office of the
State Comptroller), and in particular the Bureau’s Debt
Issuance Approval Policy, available at http://www.osc.sta
te.ny.us/pension/policystatement_guidelines020105.pdf. Also,
New York’s comptroller must approve the private sale of most
local governments’ variable rate bonds. N.Y. Local Finance
Law, 54.90, 57.10; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 2, section
37.1.
31See, e.g., SEC report, supra note 15, at 17 (‘‘Negotiated
offerings appear to be more expensive for issuers than com-
petitive offerings both in terms of bond yields and under-
writer gross spreads’’); Simonsen et al., supra note 16, at 716
(‘‘We conclude that, absent some compelling reason, competi-
tive sales should be used. In other words, the threshold for the
use of negotiated sales should be much higher. State statutes
or regulations that require justification for negotiated sales
seem sensible at a bare minimum’’).
32N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. section 159-51 (‘‘No bonds may be
issued under this Article unless the issue is approved by the
Local Government Commission’’); Charles K. Coe, ‘‘Prevent-
ing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North Carolina
Approach,’’ 27 Public Budgeting & Finance 39, 41 (2007)
(‘‘The LGC sells all GO bonds competitively. . . . In deciding
whether a local government can sell a GO bond, the LGC
evaluates the adequacy of the bond amount, the bond’s effect
on the property tax rate, and whether the bond can be
marketed at a reasonable interest rate’’).
33See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. section 159-181(c) (‘‘The
Local Government Commission shall have authority to im-
pound the books and records of any unit of local government
or public authority and assume full control of all its financial
affairs (i) when the unit or authority defaults on any debt
service payment or, in the opinion of the Commission, will
default on a future debt service payment if the financial
policies and practices of the unit or authority are not im-
proved, or . . . ’’).
34See Coe, supra note 32; Kimhi, supra note 6, at 679-683,
Stephen C. Fehr, ‘‘North Carolina Agency Is Local Govern-
ment Lifeline,’’ Stateline, June 6, 2012, available at http://
www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/north-
carolina-agency-is-local-government-lifeline-85899396242
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Note that the composition of the California Debt
and Investment Advisory Commission’s (CDIAC)
Board is similar to that of the North Carolina LGC,
both of which are led by an elected treasurer.35 Both
entities are created by statute.36 Also, like the LGC,
the CDIAC charges issuers fees.37 That suggests
that the path to (at least) New York-style reform in
California might not be that forbidding. First, the
CDIAC, supported by fees, could be required to
approve all debt not sold competitively. Second,
CDIAC approval could be required for all local debt
with some potentially problematic characteristics,
such as those issuances that involve complex struc-
tures, rely on a speculative revenue stream, or are
not voter approved.38 Note that having good default
rules is particularly important because the required
approval should not result in long delays.39 Third,
there could be additional sensible default rules for
negotiated sales (and complex financings), perhaps
allowing them presumptively in the case of large or
sophisticated issues or issuers.40 Note that giving
the CDIAC more authority in approving debt is
consistent with the CDIAC recently being given
greater authority regarding municipal bankrupt-
cies.41
Conclusion
Though we think improving debt issuance prac-
tices is worth doing in and of itself, we would prefer
that optimizing local debt issuance practices occur
as part of larger reforms to local government fi-
nance. That is especially true considering the uncer-
tain size of the current problem with local-
government borrowing and the many other fiscal
questions facing state and local governments. We
would not suggest that creating a state-level debt-
financing authority is a priority outside a larger
package of reforms.
Instead, we have argued that — at least in
California — the creation of a state-level debt-
financing authority should be accompanied by a
reduction in the voter approval thresholds for local-
government debt issuances. In our view, lowering
the approval thresholds for local-government bor-
rowing is imperative if the state is going to deprive
local governments of a vital source of contributions
to bond campaigns through mandating competitive
sales. To do otherwise would be to effectively dis-
courage local government infrastructure financ-
ing.42 We think that encouraging more infrastruc-
ture finance at a time of high infrastructure needs
and high unemployment is surely the better course.
Thus, a Proposition 39-type proposal, with lower
voter approval thresholds tied to greater profes-
sional state-level oversight, strikes us as extremely
promising. ✰
(‘‘The three national agencies that evaluate municipal bonds
think so highly of the commission that they have rewarded
North Carolina communities with bond ratings higher than
those in most of the United States’’).
35Compare California Gov’t Code section 8855 with N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. section 159-3(a). New York’s comptroller, like
California’s, is elected. N.Y. Const., Art V, section 1; Calif.
Const., Art. V, section 11.
36Cal. Gov’t Code section 8855(a); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
section 159-3.
37N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. section 159-6; Cal. Gov’t Code
section 8856.
38California has already mandated that in the context of
schools. Calif. Ed. Code section 17150.1 (county offices of
education must approve non-voter-approved debt).
39Michigan’s Municipal Finance Commission, a state en-
tity much like the ones under discussion, was ultimately
disbanded in part because of the administrative burdens that
it imposed. Joel L. Piell and Ruth H. Swartout, ‘‘So You Want
to Finance A Firehall? Michigan’s Revised Municipal Finance
Act,’’ 48 Wayne L. Rev. 363, 367-370 (2002).
40Or perhaps in other cases. One intangible advantage
attributed to negotiated sales is that they encourage the
forming of long-term relationships between borrowers and
financial professionals — that is, a banker knows that she
will be an entity’s banker just so long as she provides good
service, including between debt issuances. We are unsure how
important those relationships are for most issuers that would
be issuing vanilla debt under the watchful eye of the state
regulator. Yet we acknowledge that there might be smaller
specialized issuers who would benefit from having the secu-
rity of a longer-term arrangement.
41Cal. Gov’t Code section 53760 et seq. Indeed, section 1 of
AB 506, 2011-2012 Leg. Sess., the statement of intent regard-
ing this reform, is an outline of a theoretical argument for
better state management of local debt.
42And that would be especially problematic in light of the
end of redevelopment entities in California.
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